In January 2007 the Eu Again Expanded as Which Two Nations Were Added to Its Roster of Members

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Introduction

On 1 May 2014, the European Union (EU) celebrated the tenth ceremony of its outset enlargement to include postal service-communist states in E Central Europe. (i) Some of the statements made on the occasion reflect a item understanding of the significance of eastern enlargement, namely in terms of the re-unification of the European continent. For example, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy claimed that "finally Europe had become 'Europe' again". (2) This understanding of the EU's eastern enlargement also underpins its inclusion in this web dossier as i of the most of import European remembrance dates in 2014.

Moreover, such an interpretation resonates with the academic debate near the EU's motivation for its eastern enlargement. (3) This debate suggests that although calculations of the costs and benefits of enlargement played an important role both for the EU members and the and so bidder countries, this is not the whole story. Cloth cost-benefit calculations adamant Member State preferences towards enlargement; and the costs for the incumbents explain why the enlargement process took then long and why the accession treaties were rather unfavourable to the new Member States. (4) Yet the EU'south collective decision to enlarge eastwards despite the costs involved for some of the Member States – each of which has the ability to veto enlargement – can just be fully understood when taking account of the EU's self-ascribed identity as a pan-European customs of democracies.

However, 10 years afterwards the offset eastern enlargement (5) that was and so strongly associated with ending the partition of Europe, attitudes towards further enlargement are distinctly negative, both amid EU citizens and Member State governments. Is this increasing opposition the outcome of the impact that these before eastern enlargements had on the European union? Did a negative bear on of enlargement on the Eu undermine the continued integration of the continent through further enlargement? And even if Eu enlargement without doubt contributes to the integration of the two halves of the continent, to what extent has enlargement helped to overcome the partitioning of the continent - specifically with regard to the spread of democracy?

This paper beginning turns to the question of the Eu's impact on commonwealth in would-be and new Fellow member States and whether it has helped to overcome the division of the continent. The EU'southward ability to trigger liberal democratic reforms in candidate countries should not be overestimated, especially when information technology faces illiberal and authoritarian governments. In addition, European union institutions are highly constrained in sanctioning democratic 'recidivism' in Member States after they have completed their accession to the EU. Nonetheless, there is no full general deterioration of democracy in new member states and, albeit more limited, the EU's continued ability to influence domestic political changes in candidate countries through conditionality remains perhaps surprisingly durable.

The paper and then turns to the question how the EU's mental attitude to enlargement has changed since 2004. There are articulate signs of an 'enlargement fatigue' as Fellow member State governments take become generally more than reluctant to accept boosted candidate countries. I explore whether these negative attitudes stem from the impact that eastern enlargement had on the Eu in ii key areas: the EU's controlling capacity and the rule of police force within the enlarged Eu with regard to the new Member States' compliance with EU police. This review suggests that instead of the impact of before enlargements, the electric current aversion to enlargement is partly a government response to perceived cultural threats and anti-immigration sentiments in public opinion. Partly opposition is also due to structural difficulties in the current candidates that make information technology more challenging to come across the requirements for European union accretion. At the same fourth dimension, reforms continue beyond most candidate countries and, albeit incrementally, they have moved closer to EU membership and enlargement remains a cardinal consequence on the EU'southward agenda.

The impact of enlargement on democracy in new members and candidate countries

The EU'southward impact on domestic change in candidates for accession has been unprecedented in the context of the countries that joined in 2004/2007. The EU'south accretion conditionality – tying the advantage of membership to candidate countries' compliance with atmospheric condition set by the European union – played a key role in this procedure. (6) At the same fourth dimension, this bear upon has been generally much more pervasive with regard to economic policy – the alignment with European union legislation – in countries that already largely met the EU'south political conditions. With regard to political conditions, especially concerning liberal democratic principles, the EU'southward ability to affect domestic changes has been more than express.

The democratic forepart-runners amidst the mail service-communist countries democratised without much influence of the European union. At the other end of the spectrum, the EU was fairly powerless in countries with illiberal governments. In these countries, compliance with the EU's political conditions, such every bit republic and human rights, threatened prohibitively high domestic aligning costs for the ruling elites. Political conditionality has therefore been ineffective in Belarus, or in Slovakia under Vladimir Mečiar, and Croatia nether Franjo Tudjman.

The European union's influence on democracy arguably rested primarily on its power to contribute to a lock-in of autonomous change once illiberal parties lost elections to coalitions of liberal autonomous parties. (7) In Slovakia or Croatia, the European union did not crusade the electoral victories of liberal opposition parties. But once the new governments carried out political reforms that brought the land closer to accession, these reforms were maintained fifty-fifty if the previous governing parties returned to power.  Such parties unremarkably had to moderate their balloter platforms to appeal to voters; and once elected, equally they besides had to fear an balloter backlash if they endangered the progress that had been fabricated towards EU accession through reversing democratic reforms.

The European union's touch on on the countries that joined since 2004 has therefore relied on favourable domestic conditions in these countries. Moreover, the EU's power to sanction backsliding in new members after accretion is much weaker than prior to accretion. Article 7 of the Treaty on European Spousal relationship allows the European Quango to take measures confronting Member States that violate the EU's liberal democratic principle seriously and persistently. However, the bulk requirements in the European Quango and the European Parliament to employ Commodity 7 are extremely enervating.

Withal, despite the decline in the leverage of EU institutions towards illiberal practices in the Member States after accretion, a first comprehensive study undertaken five years afterward eastern enlargement plant no systematic evidence of a backsliding in the post-communist new member states. (eight) Although political instability has somewhat increased, there is no general reversal of political reforms, merely at best a slowdown in certain areas. The importance of the Eu in the process is underlined by the finding that the EU's new Member States outperform other post-communist countries precisely in those areas targeted past European union conditionality. This maybe surprising durability of reforms is attributed to increased exposure to the west for both elites and citizens through greater work and travel opportunities that pb to higher expectations of their own governments' performance.

A more recent review of the country of democracy in the EU'south new members and candidate countries, drawing on a wide range of indicators, finds a somewhat less positive picture. (9) First of all, there continues to exist a meaning divide in democratic quality betwixt the west European old Member States and the postal service-communist new Fellow member States. And although democracy in the post-communist member states has clearly improved since the end of communism, in the absence of a clear counterfactual statement how commonwealth in these countries would have evolved without the EU, it is difficult to assess how much of this improvement is due to the EU's influence. Finally, there has been some deterioration in the quality of democracy in four of the 10 mail service-communist new members, (10) namely in Latvia, Romania, Republic of bulgaria, and Hungary. Backsliding is well-nigh pronounced in Republic of latvia and Bulgaria, where republic quality has declined persistently since 2006 and 2007 respectively, while in Romania (which had been already lagging backside the other Fellow member States) and Hungary, the deterioration is a more recent dip.

These drops in autonomous quality in Republic of hungary (since 2010) and Romania (in 2012) can be straight attributed to specific behaviour of their governments, which in turn amounted to a crucial challenge for European union institutions to rein in breaches of liberal democratic values in the Member States. In Republic of hungary, the middle-right Brotherhood of Young Democrats (Fidesz) won 52.7 percent of the vote in the 2010 parliamentary election, giving information technology a two-3rd majority in parliament. This supermajority has enabled Prime number Minister Viktor Orban's government to pass a new constitution and numerous statutes and constitutional amendments. Through these constitutional changes, the authorities has full-bodied and entrenched its power in ways that contravene the principles of liberal commonwealth without, all the same, formally violating the rule of law. For example, information technology weakened the constitutional court, seized control of central public institutions (by packing them with party loyalists and extending mandates much beyond the term of parliament), changed the electoral law, and requires two-thirds majorities to change some of its policies. In Romania, the breaches of republic were less subtle. In May 2012 a new centre-left parliamentary majority suspended the center-right president. It used emergency ordinances to remove constitutional checks on the impeachment procedure, including a weakening of the constitutional court and a lifting of the 50 percent participation quorum for the referendum required to validate the impeachment.

The Eu's qualified success with regard to Romania and its failure in Republic of hungary illustrate well the scope and limits of the ability of EU institutions to counteract democratic backsliding in the Member States. (11) In Hungary, the EU's influence was rather weak. Centre-right governments and party groups in the European Parliament made it clear that they were opposed to using Article 7 against the Hungarian government. Without this threat, the Eu was unable to challenge the broader underlying problems. The Committee was merely able to bring about some incremental changes on isolated issues that had a separate basis in Eu police and made information technology possible to use infringement procedures to obtain compliance. By contrast, the Romanaian authorities complied adequately swiftly and comprehensively with the demands of EU institutions to redress the breaches of democratic principles. The EU's qualified success in Romania suggests that it is not necessarily powerless when faced with democratic recidivism in Member States. However, it might depend on a fairly demanding constellation of favourable weather condition that make it possible both to use social pressure effectively and to brand fabric threats. In contrast to Hungarian Prime number Minister Viktor Orban, Romanaian Prime Minister Victor Ponta's much more positive attitude towards the EU made him more susceptible to EU criticism. Moreover, some Fellow member States hinted that they would continue to veto Romania'southward accession to the Schengen Free Travel Surface area (which they had and so far justified, similarly to the example of Bulgaria, with Romania'due south limited progress with abuse control, reform of the judiciary and the fight against organised offense).

In sum, EU enlargement – including the EU's accession conditionality – has contributed to endmost the gap in democratic quality between the two halves of the continent, although progress amongst the post-communist countries remains uneven. The European union's influence rests primarily on contributing to a lock-in of democratic reforms, rather than an power to strength them on illiberal governments. The Eu'south ability to annul breaches of liberal democratic principles is much more limited afterwards a country has joined the European union, but there is neither bear witness of systematic backsliding, nor are EU institutions entirely powerless if backsliding occurs – especially if they face up Europhile governments that engage in illiberal practices.

European union attitudes towards enlargement, 10 years on

Ten years after the offset eastern enlargement, attitudes in the Eu towards farther enlargement – both amid publics and amid Member State governments – have become noticeably more negative. Of class it should not be forgotten that the incumbent Member States were also rather reluctant about the 2004 enlargement. The Eu'southward reluctance to commit to the goal of enlargement was a longstanding source of frustration for the post-communist applicant countries. The Fellow member States did non admit enlargement equally a shared objective until 1993; information technology took until 1998 to outset accession negotiations with the first post-communist countries; and, as mentioned above, the accession treaties were distinctly unfavourable to the new members. Even in Member States, where the government was amongst the strongest supporters of enlargement, such as Germany or Austria, public opinion was distinctly negative. All the same, public stance has become noticeably more than negative almost enlargement since 2004.

A contempo review of the literature on public stance towards enlargement in the European union reveals increasing hostility amid EU citizens. (12) Equally of 2012, Eu-wide representative surveys show a net negative opinion towards enlargement. And even when earlier surveys still indicted net back up, underneath the amass support there was considerable, and growing, opposition in many of the one-time Member States, nigh notably French republic, Germany and Austria. In these countries, public opposition to enlargement remains strongest. In that location also seems to be an eastward-west carve up in attitudes towards further enlargements: in all onetime Fellow member States, except for Kingdom of spain, a majority of the population opposes further enlargement, while in the post-communist Fellow member States – except for the Czechia and Slovakia – the bulk supports enlargement.

Although there is even so a gap between the attitudes of elites and public opinion, the position of Member Country governments towards further enlargements has become more openly hostile, partly in response to public opinion. Just as public opinion is most opposed to the accretion of Turkey and Albania, these two countries also are the main focus of open opposition from Member State governments.

In France, changes to the constitution since 2005 brand it compulsory to concord a referendum on further EU enlargements, unless the 2 houses of parliament, coming together in congress, endorse it with a enervating 3/5 bulk. This constitutional modify was a response to perceived public opposition and show that the failed ratification of the draft Constitutional Treaty in France was partly due to hostility to opposition to enlargement (even if the treaty had no link to enlargement). Politicians in Germany and Republic of austria in particular take openly questioned whether the accession negotiations with Turkey should atomic number 82 to accretion, and suggested instead a vaguely defined 'privileged partnership' (which ignores that Turkey already enjoys such a privileged partnership with the EU and it is hard to place measures, brusque of accession, to make the relationship closer).

More generally, a sense of 'enlargement fatigue' has characterised Member State government attitudes especially since the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. The dubiety surrounding ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, combined with the economic and financial crisis from 2008, made the member states and the Commission reluctant to accelerate the ongoing enlargement processes. For instance, when Montenegro and Albania submitted their formal applications for membership in December 2008 and April 2009 respectively, several Member States, led by Germany and The netherlands, took the unprecedented step to cake the Council'south asking for the Committee's opinions on these applications (which had hitherto been considered an automatic, technical human activity) for several months. Moreover, although the Commission recommended granting the condition of an official candidate country to Albania, a number of Member States in the Council have so far – every bit of May 2022 – opposed fifty-fifty such a symbolic pace.

At the aforementioned time, the negative touch of hostility to enlargement on the prospect of further enlargements should non be overstated. There has been much progress towards membership beyond the would-be members in S-East Europe, mayhap with the exceptions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where progress remains limited, and Turkey, with which accession negotiations (opened in 2005) have stalled (at to the lowest degree partly due to the failure of the Turkish government to recognise the Democracy of Republic of cyprus as well as recent restrictions on civil liberties by the AKP government). Otherwise, however, Croatia joined in July 2013. Montenegro and Serbia take started accretion negotiations. (The Onetime Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia has obtained candidate status and the only obstacle to the opening of accretion negotiations is a veto past Hellenic republic while the dispute over the state'southward proper noun remains unresolved. Kosovo – although not recognised past five member states – has ended the negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement.

Such progress however, the clearest indication of a prevailing 'enlargement fatigue' in the European union is the success of opponents of enlargement in introducing a renewed emphasis on the EU's 'assimilation chapters' every bit a key requirement for further enlargement.  The status that the EU could simply overstate if it was able to absorb new members without jeopardising the momentum of European integration had been one of the criteria listed by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. It had been controversial for being a status that was outside the control of the candidate countries and could therefore become an instrument for reluctant member country governments to stall enlargement.  In the event, the notion of the Eu's assimilation capacity did not play a major role in the 2004 enlargement. In 2006, the Commission fabricated an attempt to ascertain in clearer and more functional terms what this notion entailed: the impact of enlargement on the European union'south upkeep and its ability to implement common policies, and on constructive and accountable decision-making.

The impact of eastern enlargement on decision-making in the enlarged European union

To a large extent, the slower progress towards Eu membership of the candidate countries in south-eastern Europe can be attributed to their specific characteristics that made the starting conditions for meeting the demands for EU accession more challenging. Without doubt, the domestic conditions in the current candidate countries are less favourable than they were in the post-communist countries that joined in 2004. The state of democracy, economic evolution and state capacity were and notwithstanding are generally more problematic, not least due to legacies of the violent suspension-upward of Yugoslavia. But is the slow progress of their accession processes entirely due to these structural differences, or have attitudes in the Eu too changed as a result of negative experiences with previous eastern enlargements? Did these enlargements have an adverse effect on the EU's 'absorption capacity'? Did eastern enlargement accept a negative impact on the effectiveness of Eu decision-making and on the implementation of common policies and rules?

One of the concerns nigh eastern enlargement was how the dramatic increment in the number of Member States – from fifteen to 25 in 2004, 27 in 2007 and 28 in July 2013 – would affect the functioning of the Eu. A much larger membership could be expected to take a negative bear on on the legislative capacity of the Quango of Ministers. The increase in numbers and increasing heterogeneity of Fellow member State preferences threatened to thwart effective decision-making not merely in areas that explicitly required unanimous agreement. The threat of gridlock as well applied to other areas, due to the Quango's longstanding do to aim for consensus decisions even if formal rules allow qualified majority voting.

In addition to the challenge of enlargement for conclusion-making in the Council, there were besides concerns that the need to accommodate representatives of the new members in other European union institutions. Notably for the Commission and the European Parliament, enlargement could lead to indigestion. Adding more Commissioners and Members of the European Parliament from new Member States to these institutions – originally conceived for half-dozen member states – could impede effective internal working and efficient allocation of tasks.

The existing academic literature on the impact of enlargement on the decision-making capacity of the Eu finds no evidence that the decision-making machinery has get paralysed. (13) Enlargement has neither crippled the European union'south potential to devise new policies, nor its conflict-solving capacity. The functioning of the EU after enlargement is characterised by gradual adaptation rather than complete transformation. The accommodation has been more far-reaching in the Council and with regards to the negotiation mode and culture, rather than to the output of the process equally such.

A general challenge in assessing the affect of enlargement on decision-making is that information technology is difficult to establish a clear counterfactual argument: in the absence of enlargement, should we have expected legislative output to remain at the aforementioned level equally prior to enlargement, or would idiosyncratic factors have led to an increase, or even a decrease? These difficulties notwithstanding, studies of decision-making after enlargement mostly find that the European union's legislative output has remained stable. (fourteen) Although output decreased immediately subsequently May 2004, this drop resulted from the unusually high legislative activeness only prior to enlargement as the Quango endeavoured to pass a large amount of legislation in apprehension of possible disruptions non only through enlargement but a new European Parliament taking office in 2004.  However, information technology might have been expected that more participants in Council negotiations would at least lead to a decrease in the speed of decision-making fifty-fifty if the quantity of the output remained constant. Even so although a longer perspective on the impact of the various EU enlargements between 1976 and 2006 suggests that enlargement indeed reduces the speed of decision-making, (15) studies of eastern enlargement in detail demonstrate that on the contrary, the speed fifty-fifty increased slightly. (xvi)

Notwithstanding the continuity in the quantity of legislative output, at that place are indications that the nature and quality of determination-making has inverse later eastern enlargement. In that location appears to have been a drop in the proportion of salient or innovative legislation, with less debate in the Council and the Commission and more negotiations in closed-door meetings between the Council and the EP. (17) At the same fourth dimension, other concerns about the irresolute nature of decision-making appear unfounded. The diversity in the Fellow member States' preferences could have been expected to increase after the accession of a large number of smaller, poorer, and more agricultural post-communist countries. However, Council controlling is neither characterised by a new east-due west divide, nor have votes get more contested than prior to enlargement. (xviii)

The bear on of eastern enlargement on compliance with European union law in the enlarged Eu

Another area in which a negative affect of the 2004 enlargement might have caused greater reluctance towards further enlargements concerns the new members' compliance with Eu law. Indeed, concerns about the ability of the post-communist countries to utilise the large body of EU police force, the acquis communautaire, were a main reason for scepticism about the desirability of eastern enlargement. In response, the European Commission carried out extensive monitoring on an unprecedented scale of the then candidate countries' progress with their alignment with Eu law. In plow, the EU made progress towards accession conditional on progress with alignment. Most analyses find that the European union's accession conditionality was highly effective in bringing about domestic alignment in the postal service-communist countries, if the membership incentive was credible and the Eu'southward political conditions (relating e.g. to liberal republic, human rights and minority rights) did not impose prohibitively loftier adjustment costs on the governments of candidate countries. (19)

At the same time, a key finding of these studies raises concerns virtually the durability of compliance after accession. The Eu's impact on domestic change in candidate countries relied on the ability of material incentives – the prospect of European union membership – rather than on processes of persuasion and internalisation of the normative appropriateness of the Eu'southward rules. This finding implies that there might exist a temporal limit for EU conditionality to sustain domestic reforms once accretion changes the incentive structure for the governments of the new member states. (20) The main musical instrument for EU institutions to sanction non-compliance with EU law subsequently accretion is the threat of financial penalties through the European Courtroom of Justice. Such leverage is plain much weaker than the threat of withholding membership birthday. Even if conditionality was effective in prompting pre-accretion legislative alignment, does the European union now face up an 'eastern problem' concerning compliance with EU law?

10 years after accession, such concerns announced largely unfounded. (21) On the contrary, in many ways, the new Member States appear to outperform the old Member States. Data on infringements of EU law past the European Commission suggest that the new Member States perform not just amend on average than the old Member States. Almost of the new Fellow member States have a better compliance record than most all of the old Member States. The Czech Republic and Poland lag somewhat behind the other new Member States, and Denmark is the only old Member State among the top performers in the Eu. Nor are there signs of a significant deterioration of the new members' compliance record over time, with the exception of Poland. The new members too correct incidents of detected not-compliance cases faster than the old members, and are significantly less likely to exist referred to the ECJ by the Commission for connected not-compliance.

A more sceptical interpretation of these findings is that the good tape of the new members relies primarily on good formal transposition of Eu law into national law, but that it contrasts with serious problems when it comes to the applied application of EU law on the ground. (22) The weaknesses of domestic institutions in charge of enforcing legislation in the post-communist countries leads to a 'earth of dead messages': a decoupling of good formal compliance and deficient application and enforcement of both EU and national legislation. These insights rightly caution against overstating the conclusions drawn from the Committee's infringement statistics. By the aforementioned token, yet, another study of practical implementation in a somewhat larger number of policy areas and Fellow member States cautions confronting generalising from the area of social policy about compliance in the post-communist fellow member states.  It concludes that while practical implementation in post-communist members is prone to more than shortcomings than formal transposition, these problems are not of a unlike nature and on a different scale than the ones encountered in western and southern Europe. (23)

Corruption and labour migration

While the new members' compliance with EU constabulary is therefore hardly a reason to exist sceptical about further enlargement, there is a widespread impression in the European union that in particular accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 was premature. These 2 countries' slower progress with aligning with EU legislation delayed their accession until 2007, merely their post-accession compliance tape is fairly positive. Instead, the negative impression about the preparedness of the two countries for membership is mainly based on their lack of progress with regard to issues that the EU continues to monitor regularly through the then-called Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM).

The EU created the CVM specifically in the context of the accession of these two countries. It entails almanac monitoring past the Commission of progress with regard to the reform of the judiciary, the fight against corruption, and against organized crime. However, these issues are not every bit such role of Eu law; (24) the Commission does non monitor them in the other (older) Fellow member States and decided against proposing the utilize of CMV when Croatia joined. (25) To be sure, problems with corruption or reform of the judiciary are widely perceived to be more severe in Bulgaria and Romania than in most other Member States and they are even worse in the remaining candidate countries in the Western Balkans. (26) At the same time, information technology is problematic to brand assessments well-nigh whether EU membership of these countries is premature on this basis, as long as there is no full general Eu competence and European union-wide monitoring in this area.

Some other sense in which the earlier eastern enlargement might have negatively affected current attitudes towards farther enlargement is through immigration. Concerns well-nigh labour migration from poorer eastern Member States (not dissimilar to concerns in the original EEC about migration from Italia to the other five members) led the incumbent Member States to reserve the correct in the accession treaties to suspend the gratis movement of workers for up to vii years after accession.

The instance of the UK is instructive in this respect. The Uk was one of the few Member States that chose against limiting the free motility of workers later the 2004 enlargement. Immigration from the new Member States to the UK, in particular from Poland, was much college than the authorities had anticipated. (27) At the aforementioned time, labour migration from (new) European union Member States arguably also contributed much to the UK's economic growth in the mid-2000s. Nonetheless, the United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland authorities chose to close its labour market for the maximum vii years when Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007 in reaction to perceived public hostility. The success of the Eurosceptic Uk Independence Party in the elections to the European Parliament in May 2022 can be at least partly attributed to its successful appeal to public concerns virtually clearing from (new) European union Member States. Indeed, negative public stance towards (further) eastern enlargement in the EU more generally appears to be driven past perceived cultural threats and anti-immigration attitudes, which are in turn framed past the media and populist politicians. (28)

In sum still, the main effects of eastern enlargement on the European union – in terms of the functioning of controlling and compliance with European union police force – accept not been negative, although concerns well-nigh problems with corruption in new members and current candidates, and almost migration from new members have certainly become much more salient since the 2004 enlargement.

There is more open opposition among governments to enlargement than prior to the 2004 enlargement, especially towards Turkey. A serious deterioration of public approval has led to a hardening of government attitudes, even if elites remain more than positive. Nonetheless, information technology does not currently appear that a more fundamental change in government attitudes towards enlargement has taken place; certainly not equally a result of the feel with eastern enlargement. The more incremental and slower process of accretion in many of the electric current candidate countries appears instead related to the structural problems in the countries concerned.

Conclusions

EU soapbox has strongly associated the 2004 enlargement with overcoming the division of the continent. The enlargement process made a positive contribution to reducing the e-westward gap in democracy, even if the part that the European union can play beyond locking in endogenous democratic reforms should not be overstated. EU institutions are fifty-fifty more than constrained in sanctioning autonomous backsliding in member states after accession, simply x years afterward enlargement, at that place is no general deterioration of commonwealth in new Member States.

Ten years after the first eastern enlargement, attitudes towards further enlargement have become more negative. Even so, these changing attitudes cannot be attributed to the affect that enlargement had on the functioning of the EU, either with regard to controlling or the implementation of common policies. Instead, signs of an 'enlargement fatigue' are partly due to structural difficulties in the electric current candidates that make information technology more challenging to meet the requirements for European union accession. More than worryingly, they are also partly regime responses to perceived cultural threats and anti-clearing sentiments in public opinion.

Endnotes

(1) On 1 May 2004, the Czech republic, Estonia, Republic of hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the Eu alongside Malta and Cyprus.
(two) Agence Europe, 1 May 2014.
(three) Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2005) 'The Politics of European union Enlargement: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives', in Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds) The Politics of Eu Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches (Routledge), pp. 3-29.
(4) About notably, the new members had to hold to long transitional periods until they could bask the full benefits of membership with regard to agricultural subsidies or the free movement of labour; and their receipts through structural funds were capped.
(5) Further eastern enlargements included Romania and Republic of bulgaria in Jan 2007 and Croatia in July 2013.
(half dozen) Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds) (2005) The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
(7) Milada Vachudova (2005). Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration subsequently Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
(viii) Philipp Levitz, and Grigore Pop-Eleches (2010) 'Why No Backsliding? The European Wedlock's Affect on Democracy and Governance before and after Accession', Comparative Political Studies 43(4): 457-85.
(9) Tanja Börzel (2014) 'Coming Together or Globe-trotting Apart? Political Modify in New Member States, Accretion Candidates, and Eastern Neighbourhood Countries', MAXCAP Working Newspaper Series, No. 3, May 2014. 'Maximizing the integration chapters of the European Wedlock: Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond' (MACAP).
(ten) The data do non extend to the accession of Croatia.
(11) Ulrich Sedelmeier (2014) 'Anchoring Democracy from Above? The European Union and Democratic Backsliding in Hungary and Romania after Accretion', Periodical of Common Market Studies 52(1): 105-21.
(12) Dimiter Toshkov, Elitsa Kortenska, Antoaneta Dimitrova, and Adam Fagan (2014): The 'Erstwhile' and the 'New' Europeans: Analyses of Public Opinion on European union Enlargement in Review, MAXCAP Working Paper Serial, No. 02, April 2014, 'Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Wedlock: Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond' (MAXCAP).
(13) See the overviews in Helen Wallace (2007) 'Adapting to Enlargement of the European Matrimony: Institutional Exercise since May 2004', TEPSA Working Paper, Brussels; Mark Pollack (2009) 'Europe United?  The Bear upon of the Eu's Eastern Enlargement, Five Years On,' European View, eight(2): 239-54; Bailer, Stefanie, Robin Hertz, and Dirk Leuffen. (2009) 'Oligarchization, Formalization, Accommodation? Linking Sociological Theory and European union Enlargement Enquiry', Journal of European Public Policy 16(1): 162-74; Dimiter Toshkov (2013) 'Deadlocked? Researching the effects of enlargement on decision- making in the enlarged EU', presentation at the MAXCAP conference, FU Berlin, xxx May-1 June 2013.
(14) See e.g. the contributions in Edward Best, Thomas Christiansen, and Pierpaolo Settembri (eds) (2008) The Institutions of the European Union: Continuity and Alter (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) and Daniel Naurin and Helen Wallace (eds) (2008) Unveiling the Council: Games Governments Play in Brussels (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
(fifteen) Robin Hertz and Dirk Leuffen (2011) 'Too big to run? Analysing the bear on of enlargement on the speed of EU decision-making', European Spousal relationship Politics 12(two): 193–215.
(16) See eastward.k. Edward All-time and Pierpaolo Settembri (2008) 'Legislative Output after Enlargement: Similar Number, Shifting Nature', in Best, Christiansen, and Settembri (eds) (2008) The Institutions of the European Wedlock: Continuity and Modify (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), 183-204.
(17) Pierpaolo Settembri (2007) 'The Surgery Succeeded. Has the Patient Died? The Impact of Enlargement on the Eu', Jean Monnet Working Newspaper 04/07, New York University School of Law.
(18) See eastward.g. the various contributions to Daniel Naurin and Helen Wallace (eds) (2008) Unveiling the Council: Games Governments Play in Brussels (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
(19) See east.g. Frank Schimmelfennig, and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004) 'Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', Journal of European Public Policy eleven(four): 661-79; and the contributions to F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier (eds) (2005) The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Academy Printing).
(twenty) Rachel Epstein and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2008) 'Beyond Conditionality: International Institutions in Postcommunist Europe after Enlargement', Journal of European Public Policy 15(vi):795-805.
(21) Ulrich Sedelmeier (2008) 'Subsequently Conditionality: Postal service-Accession Compliance with European union Law in E Central Europe', Periodical of European Public Policy 15(6): 806-25; Ulrich Sedelmeier (2012) 'Is Europeanisation through Conditionality Sustainable? Lock-in of Institutional Change afterward EU Accession', Due west European Politics 35(one): 20-38; Dimiter Toshkov (2012) 'Compliance with European union Police in Fundamental and Eastern Europe: The Disaster That Didn't Happen (yet)', 50'Europe en Formation ii(364): 91-109.
(22) Gerda Falkner and Oliver Treib (2008) 'Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? The EU-15 Compared to New Member States', Journal of Common Market Studies 46(2): 293-313.
(23) Dimiter Toshkov (2012) 'Compliance with EU Law in Primal and Eastern Europe: The Disaster That Didn't Happen (yet)', 50'Europe en Formation two(364): 91-109.
(24) The master sanction of the CVM is the stigma fastened to continued monitoring; otherwise information technology envisages only the not-recognition of the decisions by Bulgarian and Romanaian courts in other member states. The Commission's decisions in July and November 2008 to freeze a total of €520 1000000 in aid for Bulgaria were for suspected fraud, rather than a sanction through CMV.
(25) This decision arguably reflects non and so much the lack of problems in these areas in Croatia, than concerns that using the CVM would be perceived by the fellow member states as an indication that the land'due south accretion was premature.
(26) Aneta Spendzharova and Milada Vachudova (2012) 'Catching Upward? Consolidating Liberal Democracy in Bulgaria and Romania after EU Accession', Westward European Politics 35(1): 39-58.
(27) For the 2004-2012 period, immigration from the eight mail service-communist fellow member states joining in 2004 was 713,000 and total net migration from these countries was 423,000 (see Carlo Varga-Silva (2014) 'Migration Flows of A8 and other EU Migrants to and from the Uk', Migration Observatory Briefing, COMPAS, University of Oxford, UK, April 2014, p. iv).
(28) Dimiter Toshkov, Elitsa Kortenska, Antoaneta Dimitrova, and Adam Fagan (2014): The 'Old' and the 'New' Europeans: Analyses of Public Opinion on Eu Enlargement in Review, MAXCAP Working Newspaper Series, No. 02, April 2014, 'Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: Lessons of and prospects for enlargement and beyond' (MAXCAP).

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Source: https://eu.boell.org/en/2014/06/10/europe-after-eastern-enlargement-european-union-2004-2014

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